Nontraditional mortgage guidance by John Olson
O
n  September  29,  2006,  the  federal  financial 
institution  regulators  (the  “Agencies”)  issued 
the  Interagency  Guidance  on  Nontraditional 
Mortgage Product Risks.1 The guidance was de-
veloped to clarify how institutions can offer nontraditional 
mortgage products in a safe and sound manner, and in a way 
that clearly discloses the risks that borrowers may assume. 
This article provides a brief summary of the guidance, but 
financial institutions should refer to the guidance itself for 
more information, and should work closely with their regu-
lator in developing or changing systems, policies, and pro-
cedures in response to the guidance. Consumers and home-
ownership counseling organizations may find this summary 
useful in understanding bank mortgage products as well as 
consumer rights and responsibilities.
Background
The  need  for  guidance  on  nontraditional  mortgage 
products arose from the increasing popularity of mortgage 
products that allow borrowers to defer payment of principal 
and, in some cases, interest. These products include interest-
only loans and payment option adjustable rate mortgages 
(ARMs) and contain the potential for substantial payment 
shock when the loans begin to fully amortize. Nontradition-
al mortgage products have been available for many years, 
but these products are now offered to a wider spectrum of 
borrowers by a much greater number of institutions.
The growth of these loans raises a series of pressing ques-
tions for regulators, lenders, and consumers: Do these loans 
pose special risks to lenders, and how are those risks best 
managed? Do consumers have enough information to make 
informed  decisions  about  these  products?  Are  consum-
ers prepared for payment shocks when loans re-set, and do 
lenders appropriately account for payment shocks? Do these 
loans help certain segments of the population become ho-
meowners, and would increased regulation inappropriately 
restrict access to credit? Alternatively, are these loans danger-
ous for some consumers, putting their dream of homeown-
ership at risk, suggesting the need for more regulation?
Overview
In response to these questions and concerns, the Agen-
cies issued guidance to financial institutions to emphasize 
the importance of developing sound underwriting standards 
and portfolio risk management practices, and to recommend 
practices for consumer disclosure to ensure that borrowers 
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are informed about both the risks and the benefits associ-
ated with these products.
The guidance applies, in general, to “all residential mort-
gage loan products that allow borrowers to defer payment of 
principal or interest,” including interest-only mortgages and 
payment option adjustable-rate mortgages. The guidance as-
serts that financial institution management should:
	 Ensure that loan terms and underwriting standards are 
consistent with prudent lending practices, including 
consideration of a borrower’s repayment capacity;
	 Recognize that many nontraditional mortgage loans, 
particularly when they have risk-layering features, are 
untested in a stressed environment; and
	 Ensure  that  consumers  have  sufficient  information 
to clearly understand loan terms and associated risks 
prior to making product choice.
The guidance is divided into three sections: Loan Terms 
and Underwriting Standards, Portfolio and Risk Manage-
ment Practices, and Consumer Protection Issues, as detailed 
below.
Loan Terms and Underwriting Standards
Qualifying borrowers: An institution’s qualifying stan-
dards  should  recognize  the  potential  impact  of  payment 
shock,  especially  for  borrowers  with  high  loan-to-value 
ratios,  high  debt-to-income  ratios,  and  low  credit  scores. 
The criteria should be based upon prudent and appropri-
ate underwriting standards, considering both the borrower’s 
characteristics and the product’s attributes. For all nontradi-
tional mortgage products, an institution’s analysis of a bor-
rower’s repayment capacity should include an evaluation of 
their ability to repay the debt by final maturity and the fully 
indexed rate.
Underwriting standards: Nontraditional mortgages can 
be an effective financial management tool for some borrow-
ers, but may not be appropriate for all borrowers. When 
qualifying  borrowers  for  nontraditional  mortgages,  banks 
need to make sure the borrower is able to repay the loan. 
The guidance states that loans should be underwritten at the 
fully indexed rate, assuming a fully amortizing payment, in-
cluding the additional payment burden from any negative 
amortization that can accrue.
Collateral-dependent loans: Institutions should avoid 
the use of loan terms and underwriting practices that may 
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financing of the property once amortization begins. Loans 
to individuals who do not demonstrate capacity to repay, as 
structured, from sources other than the collateral pledged 
are generally considered unsafe and unsound.
Risk  layering:  Risk  layering  features  such  as  limited 
documentation and simultaneous second liens should be 
accompanied by mitigating factors. Mitigating factors can 
include lower LTV and DTI ratios, higher credit scores, suf-
ficient liquid assets or other credit enhancements.
Reduced  documentation:  Reduced  documentation 
practices should be used with caution. As the level of credit 
risk increases, the Agencies expect an institution to more 
diligently verify and document a borrower’s income and 
payment capacity.
Simultaneous second-lien loans: Loans with minimal or 
no owner equity should not have a payment structure that 
allows for delayed or negative amortization without other 
significant risk mitigating factors.
Introductory  interest  rates:  When  developing  non-
traditional mortgage product terms, an institution should 
consider the spread between the introductory rate and the 
fully indexed rate. Because a wide initial spread means that 
borrowers are more likely to experience payment shock, in-
stitutions should minimize the likelihood of payment shock 
when setting introductory rates.
Lending  to  subprime  borrowers:  Mortgage  programs 
that target subprime borrowers should follow the applicable 
interagency  guidance  on  subprime  lending.2  Institutions 
should recognize that risk-layering features in loans to sub-
prime borrowers may significantly increase risks for both the 
institution and the borrower.
Portfolio and Risk Management Practices
Institutions should ensure that risk management prac-
tices keep pace with the growth and changing risk profile of 
their nontraditional mortgage loan portfolios and changes 
in the market. Active management of these risks is espe-
cially important to institutions that have experienced, or 
project, significant growth or concentration levels. To meet 
the Agencies’ expectations that institutions that originate or 
invest in nontraditional mortgages adopt more robust risk 
management practices, institutions should:
	 Develop written policies that specify acceptable prod-
uct attributes, production and portfolio limits, sales 
and securitization practices, and risk management ex-
pectations; 
	 Design enhanced performance measures and manage-
ment reporting that provide early warning for increased 
risk; 
	 Establish appropriate Allowance for Loan and Lease 
Losses (ALLL) levels that consider the credit quality of 
the portfolio and conditions that affect collectibility; 
	 Maintain capital levels that reflect portfolio character-
istics and the effect of stressed economic conditions 
on collectibility; and, 
	 Conduct stress tests on key performance drivers such 
as interest rates, employment levels and housing value 
fluctuations. Stress testing results should provide direct 
input in determining underwriting standards, product 
terms, concentration levels and capital levels.
Consumer Protection Issues
While nontraditional mortgage loans provide flexibility 
for consumers, the Agencies are concerned that consumers 
may enter into these transactions without fully understand-
ing the product terms. Institutions should provide consum-
ers with clear, balanced, and timely information concerning 
the risks of nontraditional mortgage products, including the 
risks of payment shock and negative amortization. Clear 
information should be provided at critical decision times, 
such as when selecting a loan product or when choosing a 
monthly mortgage payment option—not just upon submis-
sion of an application.
Institutions that offer nontraditional mortgage products 
must ensure that they do so in a manner that complies with 
all applicable laws and regulations. Applicable laws and reg-
ulations include the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 
which governs disclosures that institutions must provide, 
and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which 
prohibits unfair and deceptive acts or practices. Other laws, 
including the fair lending laws and the Real Estate Settle-
ment Procedures Act, also apply.
Communications with consumers: Institutions should 
provide consumers with information that is designed to help 
them make informed decisions when selecting and using 
these products. Institutions should alert consumers to po-
tential increases in payments for nontraditional mortgages, 
such as when an introductory rate expires or because of a 
cap on negative amortization. Negative amortization and its 
impact on the consumer’s loan balance and home equity 
should also be highlighted. If an institution offers loans with 
prepayment penalties or reduced documentation loans, the 
institution  should  highlight  those  features,  including  the 
premium for a reduced documentation loan. If the institu-
tion may impose a prepayment penalty, consumers should 
be alerted to this fact and to the need to ask the lender about 
the amount of any such penalty.
Monthly statements on payment option ARMs: State-
ments should enable consumers to make informed choices 
about their payment options, explaining the impact of each 
choice on the loan balance.
Practices to avoid: Institutions should avoid practices 
that obscure significant risks to the consumer. For example, 
if an institution emphasizes the comparatively lower ini-
tial payments, it should also provide clear and comparably 
prominent information alerting the consumer to the risks. 
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are unlikely to occur. Institutions should also avoid making 
one-sided representations about the cash savings or expand-
ed buying power to be realized from nontraditional mort-
gage products, suggesting that initial minimum payments 
will cover accrued interest charges, and making misleading 
claims that interest rates or payment obligations for these 
products are “fixed.”
Control  systems:  Institutions  should  put  systems  in 
place to ensure that their practices are consistent with the 
guidance. Among other things, institutions should not use 
compensation programs that improperly encourage lending 
personnel to direct consumers to particular products. Insti-
tutions that make, purchase, or service loans through third 
parties should take appropriate steps to mitigate risks relat-
ing to consumer protection discussed in the guidance. These 
Box 4.1 Comments on Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgages
On December 20, 2005, the Agencies issued for comment proposed guidance on nontraditional mortgage products. The 
comment period ended on March 29, 2006, and the final guidance was issued on September 29, 2006. Over 60 com-
ments were received by the Agencies, and comments letters are publicly available on the Federal Reserve’s website.1 
Comment letters from several prominent organizations are highlighted below.
American Bankers Association (ABA)
While the ABA also pointed out that the consumer protections in the guidance would apply only to regulated financial in-
stitutions, it listed a number of its own concerns about the guidance. The ABA asserted that the proposed guidance “over-
states the risks of these mortgage products,” would be overly prescriptive, and would inappropriately combine safety and 
soundness guidance with consumer protection guidance. The ABA also expressed concern that the guidance would result 
in compliance problems by creating an additional layer of disclosure on top of what is required by Regulation Z and RESPA; 
it suggested that “the Agencies agree on a generic consumer brochure explaining the risks of both interest-only and option 
ARMs…and specify a practical time when a lender should give the consumer the standard disclosure brochure.”
California Reinvestment Coalition (CRC)
While generally supporting the proposed guidance, CRC’s comment letter raised several areas of concern about the guid-
ance and about the market for nontraditional loans. “CRC would argue against combining stated income loans or loans with 
reduced income documentation with any nontraditional mortgages and/or subprime mortgages” (emphasis in original). 
CRC also asked that the Agencies give greater guidance to secondary market participants because it “believes that much 
of the clamor for these products comes not from borrowers but from investors.” CRC also advocated for a closer link be-
tween the guidance and the CRA, citing a Federal Reserve analysis of HMDA data that showed that lending within banks’ 
CRA assessment areas showed significantly smaller race disparities than lending outside the assessment areas.
Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA)
The MBA expressed concern that the proposed guidance would be overly prescriptive, would introduce an inappropriate 
third-party oversight standard for depository institutions, and that the guidance does not sufficiently use the authority of the 
Federal Reserve to improve consumer disclosure. The MBA stated that it is “concerned that these deficiencies will stifle 
mortgage product innovation and hurt consumers’ access to homeownership financing.” While agreeing with the Agencies’ 
recommendation that borrowers should not be underwritten at a teaser rate, the MBA asserted that “the proposed guid-
ance goes too far in detailing underwriting standards,” and will “force lenders to apply credit policies inconsistent with risk.” 
The MBA also expressed concerns in the consumer protection area, stating that guidance would create “an even more 
duplicative and fragmented system than the current one and will arguably add confusion rather than clarity.”
National Consumer Law Center (NCLC)
NCLC called the proposed guidance a “good beginning for what should be a major effort by the federal financial regulators 
to evaluate what changes need to be made in the regulation of the mortgage marketplace.” The organization urged the 
Agencies to focus on the risk to consumers inherent in these products, rather than the risk to lenders. The deficiencies in 
the guidance alleged by NCLC included the fact that the guidance would not be enforceable by consumers seeking relief 
from a lender that had not conformed to the guidance; that the guidance would not apply to lenders that are not depository 
institutions; that the guidance would provide inadequate consumer protections; and that the guidance would fail to require 
meaningful underwriting (by not requiring “fully indexed” underwriting). While NCLC applauded the Agencies focus on the 
need for appropriate underwriting, it found the proposed guidance to be “inherently limited in its reach and strength.”
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compliance with agreements and bank policy, and taking 
corrective action if the third party does not comply.
Guidance for Non-bank Entities
As noted in several comments to the Agencies on the 
proposed guidance (See Box 4.1), while nontraditional mort-
gages are offered by a range of institutions, including many 
non-bank lenders, the Agencies’ guidance applies only to 
insured depository institutions. Since the issuance of the 
guidance, however, several other regulatory and supervisory 
entities have issued similar guidance for other participants in 
the nontraditional mortgage market.
State Supervisors
In a comment letter responding to draft guidance, Neil 
Milner, President and CEO of the Conference of State Bank 
Supervisors (CSBS), wrote: “As the Interagency Guidance is 
directed towards insured financial institutions and their sub-
sidiaries and their affiliates, it appears that nonbank lenders, 
most of which are licensed and regulated by state authorities 
and control a large share of the mortgage origination market, 
may not be subject to this proposal. CSBS will encourage its 
members to determine the best course of action for distrib-
uting this Guidance, or guidance that is similar in nature 
and scope, to the financial service providers under their su-
pervision.”3 Indeed, the CSBS and the American Associa-
tion of Residential Mortgage Regulators jointly distributed 
guidance to their state agency members that “substantially 
mirrors” the federal guidance.4
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
On December 13, 2006, the Office of Federal Housing 
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) “directed Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac to immediately take action to support prac-
tices outlined in an interagency guidance on nontraditional 
mortgage product risks.”5 Director James B. Lockhart stated 
that Fannie and Freddie adopting the principles of the guid-
ance into their risk management and business practices will 
enhance industry underwriting standards, risk management, 
and consumer protection. Fannie and Freddie are expected 
to report progress on developing policies in line with the 
guidance by February 27, 2007.
Conclusion
The interagency guidance on nontraditional mortgages 
is barely two months old. Consumers, lenders, and industry 
observers will surely be sensitive to the impact of the guid-
ance on the marketplace over the coming months and years. 
Bankers need to understand and conform to the guidance, 
other lenders will surely be sensitive to the ongoing effort 
by states and other entities to adopt the guidance, consum-
ers need to understand and assert their rights under the law 
and get the information they need to make good decisions 
in the mortgage market, and industry observers will need to 
monitor the impact of this guidance on the nontraditional 
mortgage market. The concerted and collaborative effort of 
these groups, along with the Agencies, will help ensure a 
nontraditional mortgage market that is safe, fair, and profit-
able on both sides of the table. 
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